It has very few credible options for causing mass casualties.
this is unquestionably a bomb program.
Iran has to be nervous. They are half-way to the Security Council and they risk getting sent all the way.
In the case of Iraq the quality of intelligence and the analysis of that intelligence was abysmally bad.
The most difficult thing for leaders of the intelligence community is to tell the political leadership that they're really not sure, that they really don't have good information and therefore they're in the realm of guesswork.
On the other hand, if Moscow promised to support referral after another deadline, I'd be willing to accept a short delay.
Iran is now much less worried about the US attacking them because of the mess in Iraq... They're testing the waters.
The most interesting discussion is about political calculations and how Iran weighs the risks and benefits of acquiring nuclear weapons capability.
But there seems to be less agreement over whether it makes sense for Iran to actually produce a nuclear weapon.
Our assessment is technical.
[But such conclusions in Tehran are a high-stakes gamble, as is likely to be any Security Council response. Numerous safeguard violations over the past 20 years means that] until Iran restores confidence in its nuclear program, it should accept limits on activities that are dual use, and have military applications, ... There is a very strong legal case, [but] Council members are going to be very reluctant to impose significant sanctions on Iran.
We estimate, if everything goes right, if they throw all their effort into solving their problems, they might be able to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a single nuclear weapon within five years.
From Iran's point of view, the consensus at the IAEA was broken. It's an important victory for them.
When I talk to Iranians, there seems to be a consensus that Iran needs to have a latent nuclear weapon capability, in other words an option.